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11 Introduction
In this paper we examine an environment where local authorities compete to maximize
revenues from residence-based personal taxation and where individuals have the ability to
evade taxes via illegal cross-border shopping, i.e., individuals can choose in which community
to pay their contributions by lying about their place of residence. Local governments can
verify if individual agents have paid taxes, but can only imperfectly monitor if they do so
in their community of residence. Residents in each community are ordered in terms of risk
aversion and face diﬀerent incentives towards tax evasion; governments in each jurisdiction
take the residents’ choices into account when setting tax rates.
Examples of illegal cross-border shopping to avoid taxes in the United States include
smuggling of alcohol and tobacco across state borders. Although the consumption of alco-
hol and tobacco is not illegal, in many instances shipping these goods across state borders
is. Empirical studies suggest that cross-border shopping of alcohol and tobacco is a signif-
icant factor in explaining sales diﬀerentials between U.S. states; see for example Saba et
al. (1995), Crawford and Tanner (1995), and Beard et al. (1997). This evidence suggests
that cross-border shopping may hinder the ability of local and state governments to raise
tax revenues. Recently, the popular press has remarked on the potential impact of on-line
trade on avoidance of state sales taxes. In the international context, cross-border shopping
across countries appears to be a signiﬁcant source of evasion of value-added tax. Gordon
and Nielsen (1997), for example, compare tax evasion in an open economy under regimes of
value-added and income taxation.
One way of analyzing this issue is by modeling competition among states that strategi-
cally account for the cross-border shopping induced by tax diﬀerences across locations. In
our framework we characterize the individual decision of whether to evade taxes under the
assumption of risk aversion. We examine the implications of size and income diﬀerences
across communities on the relative tax rates set by rival locations. We extend existing re-
sults in the literature that small communities set lower taxes in equilibrium to the case of
risk-averse agents; the reason is that small communities generate more revenues by attract-
ing tax evaders from the large community, which more than compensates what they give
up from their tax base at home. We examine the conditions under which harmonization
to a common tax policy beneﬁts each location and their incentives to reach an agreement.
Finally, we explore the problem of designing a monitoring policy for the high-tax community.
In the literature on tax competition, Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) analyze the
eﬀects of jurisdiction size on the equilibrium tax rates and ﬁnd analogous results in a rep-
resentative agent framework. In a spatial competition framework, Kanbur and Keen (1993)
2and Ohsawa (1999) are particularly interested in identifying which countries choose to be-
come tax havens. They obtain analogous results for the case of risk-neutral individuals.
These approaches do not examine tax evasion.
Cremer and Gahvari (2000) is the only other study of evasion in a model of tax compe-
tition we are aware of that is close to ours. They examine economic integration of countries
which have two diﬀerent types of evasion behavior for their residents, and individuals may
only evade taxes if the country’s type is “dishonest”. They analyze tax evasion within the
countries in the economic union; their motivation is similar to ours, but in their framework
agents are risk neutral, as in Kanbur and Keen (1993). In our model, residents in either loca-
tion can cross-border shop to avoid high taxation, and evasion is modeled as an individual’s
choice problem. .
Another instance of cross-border shopping in the United States is the system of car
registration fees. States demand that every vehicle displays a license plate in order to
circulate, and since registration fees may diﬀer across local or state governments, agents
may illegally choose to register their car in a neighboring low-tax community (which may
require vehicle owners to produce proof of residence in that community). It is easy to verify
that a car owner has paid registration fees somewhere, but there is no easy way to check
where motorists actually drive their cars, since local authorities do not know if a car with
out-of-state plates has been in the state for one week or one year. There are, however,
penalties for perpetrators that are caught. Given a monitoring technology, the individual
decision problem can be modeled as a binary choice problem of choosing to pay taxes at
home or facing the gamble of paying taxes in the low-tax community, with possible legal
repercussions. The intuition of treating tax evasion as a lottery was ﬁrst developed by
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and has been widely used in the literature on income tax
evasion.
Casual evidence suggests that this problem may be of some relevance. For example,
the Minneapolis Star Tribune1 reports that “an estimated 35,000 Minnesotans have illegally
registered their cars in neighboring states, mostly in Wisconsin, which has lower annual
registration fees.” This represents, they say, a loss of approximately $3.5 million in the state’s
highway trust fund, to which total registration fees contribute 47% (almost $450 million).
License tabs for cars in Minnesota range from $35 to about $475, while Wisconsin has a ﬂat
fee of $45. If prosecuted, individuals face sentences of up to one year in jail and a $3,000
ﬁne. The Boston Globe2 relates the case of Massachusetts and New Hampshire: insurance
costs in Massachusetts are much higher than in New Hampshire, where auto insurance is not
1Star Tribune, January 3 1999.
2The Boston Globe, January 28 and April 6, 1999.
3Figure 1: Owned Cars vs Registered Cars by State
More than 30,000 owned cars than registered 
More than 30,000 registered cars than owned 
Less than 30,000 cars difference 
even required until the ﬁrst accident occurs. The Boston Globe also relates the concern of
the Insurance Fraud Bureau, which estimates the costs in lost insurance, taxes, and fees to
the state at about $1,200 a year per unregistered car.
Comparing the pattern of registered cars in the United States with the number of cars
people reported owning in the 1990 Census, some states appear to show an inﬂux of cars
from other states. Massachusetts, in particular, seems to be surrounded by receptor states.
The map in Figure 1 shows the number of registered cars by state compared against the
number of cars owned by households in 1990.3
In South America, Uruguayan states are found to behave strategically when setting car
registration fees. Statistical evidence suggests that diﬀerences in community sizes and in-
come distribution are relevant in determining the outcomes. Montevideo, by far the largest
community, has historically set higher fees than other municipalities. In 1995, traﬃc inspec-
tors monitored the main street access to downtown Montevideo and found that 40% of the
cars were from other communities. Maldonado, a small municipality, seems to have received
an important share of tax evaders over the years. The diﬀerent municipalities have signed
cooperation agreements in setting registrations fees, but local governments have continued
competing with various discount schemes for tax payments. The only community that has
rejected the agreements and has continued ﬁxing lower fees is the smallest of all communities.
The outline of this paper is as follows: We introduce the model in section 2, the agents’
decision problem in section 2.1, and we state the game between the local governments and
deﬁne an equilibrium concept in section 2.2. In section 3 we characterize the properties
3Registration data were obtained from Highway Statistics 1990 and are based on states’ registration
records. The number of cars owned by households was obtained from the reports to the 1990 Census of
Population and Housing. We computed the diﬀerence between these two series.
4of pure strategy equilibria for identical and diﬀerent communities. Then in section 4 we
analyze the incentives of communities to harmonize tax rates and the beneﬁts this may
imply. We analyze the optimal monitoring policy of a high-tax location in section 5. Finally,
we conclude in section 6.
2 The Model
There are two communities, each populated by a continuum of agents who diﬀer in levels
of income, y, that is measured in units of a private consumption good. Income distribution
in each community is deﬁned on the support [y,y] and is characterized by a continuous
density function ψi(y)=Niφ(y), where
 
φ(y)dy =1a n dNi > 0, for i =1 ,2, denotes the
population size. We use Φ to denote the cumulative distribution function of the density φ.
Individuals in each community have preferences over net income. We assume that the
utility function, u, representing preferences, satisﬁes u  > 0,u    < 0, and decreasing absolute
risk aversion (henceforth referred to as DARA).
Local governments ﬁx residence-based head taxes, Ti. Local governments can verify if
individuals contribute or not, but not if they do it where they are supposed to because agents
may choose to declare residence in a neighboring community, if it requires a lower tax, and
pay taxes there. If an individual decides to evade taxes he takes into account the local
government’s monitoring eﬀorts, represented as a constant audit probability, π ∈ (0,1). The
penalty for evasion is having to pay a constant ﬁne, F>0. Fines could be diﬀerent across
communities, but we assume they are not choice variables (presumably, they are imposed by
a federal authority). For simplicity, we assume ﬁnes are the same across locations. Finally,
we assume that local governments are Leviathans: their objective is to maximize revenues
from taxation and penalties from perpetrators that are caught.
The model describes competition among communities for ﬁscal revenue by means of a
non-cooperative two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage local governments announce taxes rates
and in the second stage individuals make decisions on where to pay taxes.
2.1 The Decision Problem of Individuals
Given announced policies in both communities (T1,T 2), individuals have to decide whether
to pay taxes at home or lie about their place of residence and pay taxes in the rival location.
In what follows, we assume that the monitoring technology is the same across locations. An
individual in community 1 with income y derives utility u(y − T1) if he decides to pay at
home. If he lies, his expected utility is (1 − π)u(y − T2)+πu(y − T2 − F).
5Remark 1 A necessary condition for tax evasion in community 1 is T2 <T 1.As u ﬃ c i e n t
condition is T2 + F ≤ T1.
Clearly, the interesting case to discuss is when T2 <T 1 <T 2 + F,s i n c ew em a yh a v e
u(y −T1)
￿ (1−π)u(y −T2)+πu(y −T2 −F). The following two propositions refer to this
case.
Proposition 1 For any conﬁguration of taxes (T1,T 2), and for each community i,t h e r e
exists a unique cut-oﬀ income level, y∗
i ∈ [y,y], such that every agent in community i with
y ≥ y∗
i decides to evade, and those with y<y ∗
i decide not to.
Proof. Examine the problem of an agent in community 1. For any y ∈ [y,y], deﬁne
c(y,T2) to be the certainty equivalent of the evasion lottery, i.e., the level of net income such
that u(c(y,T2)) = (1−π)u(y−T2)+πu(y−T2−F). An agent with income y will not evade
if and only if u(y − T1) > (1 − π)u(y − T2)+πu(y − T2 − F); by the deﬁnition of c(y,T2),
this is equivalent to requiring that y − c(y,T2) >T 1. Since u satisﬁes DARA, y − c(y,T2)i s









y if y − c(y,T 2) ≤ T1
y if y − c(y,T2) ≥ T1
ˇ y if y − c(y,T 2) >T 1 and y − c(y,T2) <T 1.
(2.1)
Thus y∗
1 is unique and satisﬁes the required properties; y∗
2 is deﬁned analogously.
There are three cases shown in Figure 2.4 In case B there is no tax evasion, in case
C everybody evades, and in case A only the rich do. The individual with income level
y = y∗
1 is indiﬀerent. If y∗
1 = y, there is no tax evasion. According to this proposition,
if in equilibrium there is any tax evasion in a community, it is the rich agents who evade.
This result is analogous to the spatial competition models of Kanbur and Keen (1993) and
Ohsawa (1999), in which individuals with the lowest transportation cost, i.e., those closest
to the border, are the ones more likely to evade.
The cut-oﬀ income level, y∗
1, satisﬁes the following:
Proposition 2 y∗
1 is non increasing in T1 and non decreasing in T2.
4Given that u  > 0, by the inverse function theorem, u−1 exists and is diﬀerentiable, thus c is continuous
and diﬀerentiable in y.






















Case C: Everybody Evades
Proof. It is enough to prove the result for an interior y∗
1 ∈ (y,y). In this case, the implicit
function theorem implies that y∗








1 − T1) − (1 − π)u (y∗
1 − T2) − πu (y∗
1 − T2 − F)
< 0.
The sign follows because the numerator is positive and the denominator is negative by lemma
1 in the appendix. We can show that
∂y∗
1
∂T2 > 0 in the same manner. An analogous result can
be established for y∗
2.
















Intuitively, when the tax diﬀerence is larger, poorer agents can aﬀord to take the risk of
evading. If the gains from evasion are small, only the richest people will be able to aﬀord
choosing the implied lottery of tax evasion. See Figure 3. Clearly, if taxes coincide there is
no incentive to evade.
72.2 Game Between Local Governments
Local governments set their taxes strategically in a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, they
announce their policies; in the second stage, individual decisions on tax evasion determine
the tax base in each community.
The solution concept is subgame perfection. An equilibrium is characterized by backward
induction replacing the decision rules of individuals—represented by cut-oﬀ levels of income
y∗
i—in the objective functions of the local governments. The values y∗
i determine who evades
taxation in each location. The tax base is formed by local agents who do not evade and
foreign agents who evade in their community of origin. In addition, ﬁnes are collected from
local agents who evade and are caught; by the law of large numbers, they represent a fraction
π of tax evaders.
The revenue function of local government 1 is given by the following expression:
R1 (T1,T 2)=
 
{N1 + N2[1 − Φ(y∗
2)]}T1 if T1 ≤ T2
N1Φ(y∗
1)T1 + N1[1 − Φ(y∗
1)]πF if T1 ≥ T2,
(2.2)
where Φ(y∗
i) is the fraction of individuals that evade taxes in community i.
Deﬁnition 1 A pure strategy equilibrium for this environment is a tax for each community,
(T1,T 2) cut-oﬀ income levels, y∗
1 and y∗
2, such that:
i) Ti solves the problem of community i given the policy of the other community, Tj,f o r
i,j =1 ,2,i = j, and aggregate decision rules, summarized by cut-oﬀ levels y∗
1 and y∗
2,
ii) income levels y∗
1 and y∗
2 are determined consistently with individual decision problems
when residents take policies (T1,T 2) as given.
The above deﬁnition of equilibrium corresponds to the Nash equilibrium of the reduced
game deﬁned by incorporating agents’ best responses to announced governments’ policies in
the payoﬀ functions of the local governments: ΓN =[ I,{Si},{Ri}], where I = {1,2} is the




⊂ is the set of strategies for local
government i,a n dRi is the payoﬀ deﬁned in equation (2.2).5 It is easy to see that the payoﬀ
functions in our problem need not be concave because of the endogenous determination of the
tax base. In such cases, there are no general results guaranteeing existence of pure strategy
equilibria. However, mixed strategy equilibria are shown to exist in Glicksberg (1952) under
continuity of the payoﬀ functions alone.6 In what follows we will examine properties of pure
5Notice that given the structure of the model, in order to guarantee non-negativity of net income for the
lowest income type, we have to deﬁne a maximal tax T<y .
6In our case, the objective function Ri is continuous if the cut-oﬀ levels y∗
i are continuous and the income
distribution function has no mass points. In the appendix we show y∗
i is continuous.
8strategy equilibria when they exist, in particular, the way policies determine the mobility of
the tax base through the tax evasion decisions of individuals.
3 Size Eﬀects on Policies
In the model, communities may diﬀer only in the size dimension. In this section, we ask
whether small communities set lower taxes in equilibrium. In order to examine the eﬀects
of diﬀerences in community size, we allow for diﬀerences in total mass, Ni. It turns out
that having a smaller population allows locations to gain by undercutting the rival’s tax rate
and attracting a large mass of evaders. The large location, in contrast, has more to lose by
attempting to undercut the smaller rival because of its own large base.
3.1 Identical communities: N1 = N2
With identical communities we could imagine that an asymmetric situation could be an
equilibrium: for example, one community sets lower taxes and attracts the top portion of
the population of the rival community, which sets a higher tax on its reduced base. But
this intuition is not correct, as shown in proposition 3: with equally sized communities there
cannot be an asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proposition 3 If N1 = N2 = N, then in any equilibrium (T1,T 2), T1 = T2.
Proof. Suppose there is an equilibrium with T1  = T2. Without loss of generality, let
T1 >T 2. Lemma 2 in the appendix then implies that T1 − T2 >π F .S i n c e ( T1,T 2)i sa n
equilibrium, we must have
R1(T1,T 2) ≥ R1(T2,T 2)
R2(T1,T 2) ≥ R2(T1,T 1).














9Notice that (1 − Φ(y∗
1)) > 0, i.e., there is some evasion, otherwise, by the same argument
as in lemma 2, it would pay jurisdiction 2 to raise its tax rate. Then T1 − T2 ≤ πF,a
contradiction.
It turns out that the only possibility for equilibrium in pure strategies with identical
communities is the one in which governments set maximal taxes, as implied by the next
result.
Proposition 4 Assume F>0 and π>0. If there exists a symmetric equilibrium in pure
strategies, (T,T), it must be that T = T.
Proof. Suppose (T,T) is an equilibrium and T<T. In this situation there is no evasion,
since, for any agent with income y in either community,
u(y−T) > (1−π)u(y−T)+πu(y−T −F).
Because the inequality is strict, either community can slightly increase its tax without induc-
ing any evasion and increase its revenue. Therefore (T,T) could not have been an equilibrium.
The diﬃculty in ﬁnding equilibria where tax rates are not maximal lies in the assumption
that all individuals must pay taxes. If local governments allowed individuals for whom net
income became negative to be exempt from taxation, it might then be possible to ﬁnd pure
strategy equilibria where taxes fall below the highest income level. This extension would
require using exceptional qualiﬁcations for tax evaders, for example, when an individual is
only constrained if he gets caught.
3.2 Diﬀerent communities: N1 >N 2
Casual evidence suggests that larger (or more densely populated) communities tend to
set higher taxes. Smaller communities, by ﬁxing a lower tax, can generate extra revenue
collected from tax evaders attracted from the rival community—at the cost of losing revenue
from the local population. Intuitively, small communities have more to gain from attracting
a larger mass of tax evaders, because the density of their own tax base is small. In our model
when community sizes diﬀer, the larger community does not set the lower tax.
Theorem 1 When locations diﬀer in size, the smaller community will set the smaller tax
rate, i.e., (N1 − N2)(T1 − T2) > 0.
10Proof. Let θ = N1/N2. Without loss of generality, let T1 >T 2.
In equilibrium we must have,
R1(T1,T 2) ≥ R1(T2,T 2) (3.1)
R2(T2,T 1) ≥ R2(T1,T 1).






T2 + T2θ[1 − Φ(y
∗
1)] ≥ T1.




The argument in lemma 2 implies that when T1  = T2, in equilibrium we must have |T1−T2| >
πF, it also implies that there is some evasion, i.e., (1 − Φ(y∗
1)) > 0, and therefore the result
follows.
The smaller jurisdiction therefore has strong incentives to undercut its larger rival’s rate
to induce evasion in that community. Intuitively, in order to sustain evasion in equilibrium,
the diﬀerence in tax rates has to exceed the expected payment of ﬁnes.
An interesting question that arises is whether a similar result can be established if instead
of examining large and small communities, we looked at rich vs. poor jurisdiction, as it is
often done when analyzing population migration models in the spirit of Tiebout (1956). It
turns out that examining the eﬀects of diﬀerences in income distribution, normalizing N1 =
N2 = 1 and allowing the density functions, φi, to vary, does not yield a clear characterization,
as in the case of size diﬀerences. If we deﬁne community 1 to be richer than community 2
when Φ1(x) ≤ Φ2(x) for all x ∈ [y,y], there are two opposing eﬀects. Taking the tax rate of
the rich community as given, the poor community by ﬁxing a lower tax can attract the top
portion of the rich community—a stealing eﬀect—but it can also set a higher tax to increase
local revenues, knowing that its local agents will probably not take the chances of evasion—a
capturing eﬀect. In general, it is not possible to determine which eﬀect dominates.7
7For example, let community 1 have a degenerate distribution at some income level,   y1,t h e ni th a st o
be that T1 ≤ T2. In an equilibrium with T1 >T 2 there cannot be any tax evasion in community 1. The
reason is that since all individuals are identical, tax evasion would imply that everyone evades and revenues
are zero. The government in community 1 could then increase revenues by setting the same tax as the
rival community. Now, because there is no evasion in community 1, R2(T1,T 2)=T2 <R 2(T1,T 1)=T1,a
contradiction.
114 Tax Harmonization
In this section we are interested in the possibility and the eﬀects of tax harmonization.
In a strict sense our analysis is not a welfare analysis since we will focus only on ﬁscal
revenue. We want to know (1) whether it is possible (in the sense of individual rationality)
to implement a harmonization policy over taxes, (2) under what conditions would this be
possible, and (3) how would this aﬀect revenue collection in both communities.
4.1 Harmonization with Transfers
First we restrict our analysis to the possible joint revenue gains from harmonization to a
common tax rate, T h, without discussing for the moment the incentives of each community
to deviate from the agreement. We can think of this harmonization scheme as imposed by
a federal government with the local governments forced to compel or as an agreement with
transfers between communities.
Let (T1,T 2) be an equilibrium for N1 >N 2.L e tT h be the harmonized common tax rate.
To facilitate exposition we will abbreviate notation in the following way:













R1 = N1ΦT1 + N1 (1 − Φ)πF
R2 = N2T2 + N1 (1 − Φ)T2.
It is not obvious that a harmonized common tax rate will lead to maximal joint revenues
since it may be optimal (for a joint revenue maximizer) to allow some evasion with diﬀeren-
tiated tax rates, given that there is a percentage π of all evaders that end up paying the tax
rate of one community plus the ﬁne of the other.
It turns out that if transfers can be implemented between communities, there is always
a minimum common tax rate such that both communities beneﬁt from harmonization and
it is intermediate to the tax rates in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
Note that we made no assumption on the income level of community 1. In particular the example holds
if   y1 = y2 or   y1 = y2.
12Proposition 5 Let   T ≡ ΦT1 +( 1− Φ)(T2 + πF), then communities will beneﬁt from har-














2 ≥ R1 + R2 if and only if N1Φ
 
T h − T1
 
+ N1 (1 − Φ)
 





T h − T2
 
≥ 0. Since T1 >T 2 +πF, again by lemma 2, a necessary condition is T h >T 2;
then simply solving for T h gives the desired condition.
It is interesting that the minimum harmonization tax rate required to guarantee larger
joint revenues than those in the non-cooperative equilibrium is strictly between the two
non-cooperative tax rates. The reason is that coordinating to an intermediate tax rate may
be politically more feasible than imposing the maximal tax rate, T, which would obviously
maximize joint revenues subject to the constraint of requiring a common tax rate. If an in-
termediate tax rate is chosen, however, we will see that community 2 has to be compensated.
4.2 Harmonization without Transfers
If transfers between communities cannot be implemented, possibly because they are costly
in terms of coordination or because the political implications are not desirable for the local
governments, in order for jurisdictions to agree on harmonizing policies, individual revenues
need to improve for both locations. In this subsection we do not present a theory of why
this happens, we take this fact as given and provide conditions under which harmonization
is beneﬁcial or harmful to communities when side transfers are not allowed. Thus we impose
that each community has to be at least as well oﬀ with the harmonized tax than in the non-
cooperative equilibrium. This harmonized taxation may be the result of explicit negotiations
between communities or we can think of it as an implicit collusion outcome of the game played
repeatedly over inﬁnite periods with a suﬃciently high discount factor.8
Proposition 6
a) Neither community beneﬁts from a harmonized tax rate lower than the smaller commu-
nity’s non-cooperative tax rate.
b) If (T1,T 2) is an equilibrium with T2 <T 1, the smaller jurisdiction never beneﬁts from a
harmonization scheme that sets a common tax rate T h with T2 ≤ T h ≤ T1.
8In the short run communities have an incentive to deviate. Therefore harmonized taxation is a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium only if the present value of future losses from not cooperating today is high enough.
13Proof. a) The smaller jurisdiction does not beneﬁt since it will not collect taxes from
evaders and it is collecting lower taxes from its own residents. With respect to the larger
jurisdiction, note that for T h <T 2 it is the case that
R1 (T1,T 2) ≥ R(T2,T 2)=N1T2 ≥ N1T
h,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from T1 being a best response to jurisdiction 2 ﬁxing a tax
rate of T2. Therefore the larger community does not beneﬁt from taxes below T2 either.
b) If we harmonize to the larger tax rate, T h = T1, then clearly,
R2(T1,T 2) ≥ R2(T1,T 1)=N2T1,
because T2 is a best response to T1. If we harmonize to the smaller tax rate, then
R2(T1,T 2)=N2T2+N1 (1 − Φ)T2 >N 2T2 = R2(T2,T 2).
Now, if we harmonize to an intermediate tax rate, T h,




This result is analogous to proposition 9 in Kanbur and Keen (1993), where a similar
problem is analyzed with risk-neutral individuals. We now give conditions under which
harmonization would garner beneﬁts for both communities.
Proposition 7 If there can be no transfers between jurisdictions, communities can beneﬁt
from harmonization if and only if
T
h >m a x {T2 (1 + (1 − Φ)θ),T 1}.
Proof. We need the ﬁscal revenues of each community in the harmonized scheme to be
larger than in the non-cooperative case. Consider ﬁrst the small community: Rh
2 >R 2 if
and only if
N2T
h >N 2T2+N1 (1 − Φ)T2.
But by proposition 6, the smaller jurisdiction will not beneﬁt if the harmonized tax rate is
not greater than T1, therefore the stated condition must hold. The larger community will
14also beneﬁt, since Rh
1 >R 1 if
N1T
h >N 1ΦT1+N1 (1 − Φ)πF,
and by lemma 2 in the appendix this holds since T1 >T 1 − T2 >π F , and therefore T h >
T1 =Φ T1 +( 1− Φ)T1 > ΦT1 +( 1− Φ)πF.
The larger jurisdiction would beneﬁt from harmonization with a tax rate even smaller
than T1 since evasion would be prevented in the harmonized environment. The necessary
condition for the larger community to beneﬁt from a harmonized tax rate is
T
h ≥ T1−[1−Φ][T1−πF],
but a common tax rate equal to the right-hand side would harm the smaller jurisdiction.
The premium the small jurisdiction has to receive in terms of a higher common tax rate
is proportional to the fraction of evaders from the large location in the non-cooperative
equilibrium. Therefore whenever the smaller community agrees to harmonize taxes, the
larger one will as well.
5 Optimal Monitoring
In this section we consider situations in which communities have already committed to
a tax policy and now have to choose optimal monitoring, which is costly.
Monitoring determines the risk that individuals face in the case of evasion. In our previous
environment, when a given monitoring policy is less stringent, communities face a more elastic
tax base, which implies tougher competition. Local governments respond by lowering taxes
to reduce the incentives to evade. In the extreme case of no monitoring eﬀort, undercutting
may lead to cut-throat competition. Intuitively, if either the (ﬁxed) probability of getting
caught or the penalties are equal to zero across locations, whenever taxes diﬀered, everyone
in the high-tax location would choose to evade. Thus in equilibrium taxes would have to be
equal because the tax base is perfectly mobile. Undercutting—in a Bertrand competition
spirit—then would drive tax rates to zero. Revenue collection in such a case would be zero
in each community.
In what follows we assume that the probability of getting caught is a policy instrument
for the local communities, given now ﬁxed tax policies across locations.9 We also assume
9In the 1998 agreement between communities in Uruguay, taxes were ﬁxed for each location and the only
variable still under the control of local governments was their monitoring eﬀort.
15there is a per capita cost of monitoring, given by an increasing function m(π).
We assume T1 >T 2 and T1 <T 2 +F so that it is possible to induce at least some agents
not to evade. Clearly, community 2 will not monitor because it has the lower tax, so the
f o c u si so nc o m m u n i t y1 .
5.1 Homogenous Monitoring
Suppose local governments are not able to set diﬀerent levels of monitoring in terms of
income level. In this situation, given the ﬁxed tax rates in each community, local revenues


















where the response of the cut-oﬀ level, y∗
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< 0. (5.3)
The left-hand side in (5.2) shows the marginal beneﬁt of increasing the level of monitoring.
The ﬁrst term indicates the net marginal gain from having evaders pay taxes instead of ﬁnes,
and the second term is the increase in ﬁnes collected from perpetrators that are now more
likely to get caught. The right-hand side represents the marginal cost of increasing the level
of monitoring.
The next example illustrates the case of a high-tax community optimally choosing a
constant monitoring policy. As would be expected, it is optimal for this community to allow
some level of evasion. In Figure 4 we show the revenues as a function of the audit probability
π.
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• F =6 ,T 1 =5 ,T 2 =3 .5
In this community, the optimal monitoring policy, π =0 .2208, results in an income cut-
oﬀ value of y∗
1 =8 9 .54. Given the Pareto distributions we assumed, this implies that the top
4.82% of agents in community 1 decide to evade taxation.
5.2 Diﬀerentiated Monitoring
It is desirable to analyze the possibility of having monitoring depend on income levels. If
it were possible to implement such a policy, it is clear that there would have to be a positive
level of monitoring for all income levels in the high-tax community, since otherwise whoever
is not monitored will evade. To get some intuition, consider initially a ﬁxed monitoring
policy, π, which results in an interior cut-oﬀ income level, y∗
1. The local government may
increase net revenues by changing to a variable monitoring policy, π(y). A variable policy
would allow the government to lower costs of monitoring agents with income levels below y∗
1,
without inducing them to evade, but it would be costly to induce agents with incomes above
y∗
1 not to evade. The optimal monitoring policy for each income level in this environment is
obtained comparing the net beneﬁts of collecting taxes or expected ﬁnes for each individual.
Intuitively, there may exist an income level   y1 such that it does not pay community 1 to
prevent agents with y ≥   y from evading. The local government should set a monitoring
policy for these agents who evade so as to maximize expected revenue from ﬁnes.
In the region of income levels where the government induces compliance, it will maximize
the diﬀerence between tax and monitoring costs per individual, subject to inducing agents
to pay taxes at home. The optimal policy in this region is obtained with a constrained cost
minimization problem.
17In the region of income levels where the government allows evasion and collects ﬁnes,
it will maximize the diﬀerence between ﬁnes and costs of monitoring agents who choose to
evade.
We show in the following paragraphs that in the region of compliance the net beneﬁt
from collecting taxes, T − m(πT(y)), is decreasing in y. In the region of tax avoidance, the
monitoring policy of evaders, πF, will not depend on income, and the net beneﬁt will be
constant.
Proposition 8 There exists a cut-oﬀ level of income, ˆ y, such that the optimal monitoring





u(y−T2)−u(y−T2−F) if y<  y
πF = m −1(F) if y ≥   y.
Proof.
Step 1. In the compliance region, since monitoring is costly, the local government will not
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implies that πF = m −1(F) is constant.

















The ﬁrst-order condition is given by
T −m(π
T(  y)) = π
FF −m(π
F).
The left-hand side is the net marginal beneﬁt from compliance, and it is a strictly decreasing
function of y. The right-hand side is the net marginal beneﬁt from expected ﬁnes in the
avoidance region, and it is a constant function. The level   y is thus uniquely deﬁned.
The determination of the cut-oﬀ level,   y, is shown in Figure 5.






Given that the large community’s tax rate, T1, is not guaranteed to be equal to the
term πFF, the expected beneﬁt from evaders, the schedule π (y) can admit discontinuities
19at the cut-oﬀ level, ˆ y, but only in downward jumps, since community 1 could improve by
saving on monitoring costs if πF >π T (y). Also, although we have characterized an interior
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, and in that case the monitoring schedule would coincide
with πT (y).
6C o n c l u s i o n
The model developed in this paper examines tax competition in a framework with
residence-based taxation in which authorities can only imperfectly monitor the origin of
tax payers who may choose to evade local taxation by pretending to be residents of the rival
low-tax community. We characterize the properties of equilibria in pure strategies when
communities diﬀer in size and ﬁnd that small communities have advantages in capturing
some tax base from their rival by undercutting their higher tax rate.
We also characterize the problem facing individual residents who evaluate the payoﬀs of
complying with local taxation and the resulting lottery of evasion. Decreasing risk aversion
implies that only high-income agents can aﬀord to choose the evasion lottery. This feature is
comparable to existing modeling strategies in spatial frameworks of cross-border shopping,
where risk-neutral individuals have unit demands and valuation net of costs of transportation
replaces our deﬁnition of income.
Our model clearly indicates that integration, in the sense of joint revenue maximization,
can always be beneﬁcial from the perspective of local governments. If communities have a way
to make side transfers between them, then the minimum tax rate required to generate joint
beneﬁts in the harmonization scheme is strictly between the two non-cooperative tax rates.
This is important if coordinating to a diﬀerent tax rate is more costly. Even without side
transfers, there are potentially important beneﬁts from harmonization when the minimum
agreeable tax rate implies a premium to the small community’s non-cooperative tax rate
proportional to the fraction of tax evaders in the large community.
In our framework, lump-sum tax policies imply that relatively less risk-averse agents can
avoid high taxes by ﬂeeing to another community. This feature makes the head tax structure
regressive. Presumably, a federal authority in charge of choosing an optimal tax structure
superseding ﬁscal competition would take into account attitudes toward risk in its design.
In an environment where locations have already committed to a set of tax policies and
have to choose monitoring eﬀorts to prevent tax evasion, we show that it may be optimal for
a high-tax community to allow some people to evade and that the audit probability should
be increasing over the compliance region and constant over the avoidance region.
20The implications of the model seem to be in line with some casual evidence for some
regions of the United States and preliminary evidence for Uruguay that ﬁnd statistical cor-
relation between community size and the distribution of car values across municipalities, as
well as between size and magnitude of registration fees.
In a more general analysis of policy coordination, particularly between countries, it would
be interesting to study the larger version of the game where both tax and monitoring policies
can be used strategically. Presumably, even when some type of coordination can be achieved
with respect to tax policies, harmonization of monitoring eﬀorts is more costly.
Another question that arises regarding integration of countries is whether allowing for
population migration implies some kind of sorting result. In such a framework, we could
study the diﬀerent implications of having borders closed to household migration, as we have
done in our model, and opening borders so that individuals who migrate are no longer
considered tax evaders. Traditional models of migration of heterogeneous population obtain
stratiﬁcation results in terms of income; in an environment with migration costs, individuals
would face the options of evading taxation or emigrating to the low-tax country, and it might


















Proof. Note that U(y∗
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The assumption of DARA implies
∂[y−c(y,T1,T2)]
∂y < 0, and therefore
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∂y > 1. From the
deﬁnition of c(y,T1,T 2), we have u (c(y,T1,T 2))
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The last equality follows from the deﬁnition of c(y,T1,T 2)a n dy∗
1 interior.
21Proposition 9 The cut-oﬀ income level, y∗
1, deﬁned in equation (2.1) is continuous in
(T1,T 2).
Proof. It is enough to show continuity for tax policies (T1,T 2) such that y∗
1 ∈ (y,y).










by lemma 1; the implicit function theorem then implies that the function y∗(T1,T 2)s u c h
that U (y∗(T1,T 2),T 1,T 2) = 0 is continuous in the set of policies (T1,T 2).
Lemma 2 If (T1,T 2) is an equilibrium with T1  = T2,t h e n|T1 − T2| >π F.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let T1 >T 2. Now suppose there is an equilibrium
(T1,T 2)w h e r eT1 − T2 ≤ πF.T h e n T1 − T2 ≤ πF implies that y − T2 − πF ≤ y − T1
for any y in community 1. Rewriting, we have that (1 − π)(y − T2)+π(y − T2 − F)=
y−T2−πF ≤ y−T1. That is, the expected payoﬀ to evading taxes is less than the payoﬀ to
paying taxes at home, and no one in community 1 would chose to evade since risk aversion
implies u(y − T1) ≥ (1 − π)u(y − T2)+πu(y − T2 − F). Therefore, since R2(T1,T 2)=N2T2
and T2 <T 1 ≤ T, it would pay community 2 to raise its tax rate T2, and therefore (T1,T 2)
could not be an equilibrium.
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